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289 
In the writings of a hermit one always also hears something of the echo of the desolate 
regions, something of the whispered tones and the furtive look of solitude; in his strongest 
words, even in his cry, there still vibrates a new and dangerous kind of silence—of burying 
something in silence. When a man has been sitting alone with his soul in confidential 
discord and discourse, year in and year out, day and night; when in his cave—it may be a 
labyrinth or a gold mine—he has become a cave bear or a treasure digger or a treasure 
guard and dragon; then even his concepts eventually acquire a peculiar twilight color, an 
odor just as much of depth as of must, something incommunicable and recalcitrant that 
blows at every passerby like a chill.  
-- Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Introduction:  
 
In the beginning of a course on Heidegger’s Being and Time it was mentioned to us that 
Heidegger had been involved in National Socialism, but we were told to put this thought on hold 
and to try to read the book without reference to this fact. Throughout the course, however, the 
question of this relationship remained on my mind. In the library I read some of an old book 
curiously titled German Existentialism. In the introduction the author complained that Heidegger 
had insulted ‘high mother philosophy’ in his decision to join the Nazi party, and the following 
speeches were examples of this betrayal. The transcripts of the speeches made during his time as 
Rector of Frieberg for the party were disturbing and weighed on my mind as we worked our way 
through the immensity of Being and Time. I looked for evidence of problematic ideas that may 
have been related to Nazism but overall, could find nothing. Indeed the work seemed antithetical 
to Nazism in its descriptions of the everyday and the “They.” How could this philosopher have 
been a part of it? How could he have fallen in with the “They” and followed the loud, small man 
that was Hitler (In a conversation with Jaspers he seemed to remark that it had something to do 
with his beautiful hands)? One day back home after the course had ended I was having a 
conversation with my neighbor about Heidegger. He told me about an article he had read in 
Foreign Affairs about a new source that had been published, the Schwarze Hefte or Black 
Notebooks, in which there was evidence of anti-Semitism. Tom printed a copy for me, beginning 
my investigation into the controversy.   
Heidegger and his writing has been the subject of controversy ever since his involvement 
in National Socialism. He remained controversial for several reasons. Partly because he refused 
to apologize for or acknowledge the absurdity and tragedy of the deaths of millions of Jews and 
other minorities in concentration camps, in which, at least in the eyes of the “victors,” he was 
! #!
implicated. Partly because some, particularly in the French school, continued to maintain that his 
foray into National Socialism had been a personal mistake, and further that Nazism had not 
found its way into his philosophy. Still, others, most popularly Victor Farias, argued that 
National Socialism was central to his philosophy, which was itself inherently fascist.  However, 
the controversy seemed to be coming alive again, but in new form, with the questions posed by 
the Black Notebooks. There were many articles, some expressing resignation that their highly 
regarded philosopher could have stooped so low as to make anti-Semitic remarks, and some for 
whom it was proof that we could finally be rid of him, the Jew-hating Nazi. A very small number 
still maintained that Heidegger’s work is important despite his National Socialist past. Peter 
Trawny, the editor of the Black Notebooks, raised the question of whether these “being-historical 
anti-Semitisms” had “contaminated” his philosophy in some way. Most certainly the reflections 
in the Black Notebooks prompt us to reexamine the Philosopher’s work in light of these new 
revelations. They compel us to ask: what role do these anti-Semitisms have in the Black 
Notebooks, and further, in his greater philosophy? Do they have any at all? Somewhere in the 
“Heidegger Controversy” someone remarked that Heidegger had even kept his anti-Semitism 
secret from the Nazis themselves. Why would he do this and what really is the nature of his 
relationship to the National Socialist Movement? 
The first part of this project investigates Being and Time, specifically the sections about 
the concept of “historicality.” I originally decided to look back to the work because I needed to 
build a better understanding of Heidegger’s concepts of history, which is a major subject in the 
Black Notebooks. However, when I read the passages this time I began to see the basis on which 
Heidegger’s affinity for the National Socialist Movement could have begun, which ultimately 
rests on his understanding of history. I also began to see possibilities upon which Heidegger 
! $!
could have characterized “World Jewry” as metaphysically different and more destructive than 
other peoples (having to do with “heritage” and the opposition between “authentic” and 
“inauthentic historicality”). As I continued to read and reread the sections on historicality while 
investigating the historical context in which the work was written, my interpretations developed 
and changed. It became more clear that Heidegger’s work was not a purely philosophical, 
ahistorical treatise, but very definitely situated within and responding to a specific time, a 
specific world. In my mind there is no doubt that Heidegger’s philosophy was responding to not 
only “philosophical” problems, such as the forgottenness of Being and the overcoming of 
metaphysics, but to historical situations that affected him in his time, such as living in a 
collapsing society after the First World War, the diagnosis of a European nihilism that was first 
and profoundly described by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, and furthermore his own Situation, 
which he later located as a turning point in world-history. In this, Hegel’s notion that philosophy 
cannot be separated from the spirit of its era is reflected: “Philosophy is identical with the spirit 
of the era (Zeitgeist) in which it makes its appearance; it is not superior to its era but simply the 
consciousness of what is substantial in it, or, it is thinking knowledge of what belongs to that 
era… Nevertheless, philosophy does stand over and above its own era, which is to say… it has 
the same content but as a knowledge of it goes beyond.”1  Thus in this part of the project I argue 
against the traditional way of reading Being and Time as an ahistorical work, separable from 
Heidegger’s historical involvement in National Socialism, against the traditional notion of 
“prima philosophia” or “first philosophy,” which, as Richard Wolin writes is “an approach to 
knowledge that betrays a superioristic disdain for the “concrete” realms of history and society.”2 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!Quentin Lauer, Hegel’s Idea of Philosophy: With a New Translation of Hegel’s Introduction to the History of 
Philosophy, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1983).!#!Karl Löwith, “The Political Implications of Heidegger’s Existentialism,” in The Heidegger Controversy: A 
Critical Reader, ed. Richard Wolin (MIT Press Edition, 1993), 265.!
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To fully understand the implications of Being and Time it needs to be read in context with its 
historical situation.  
The second part of the project investigates passages from the Black Notebooks related to 
Jewry and attempts to work out the nature of the relationship between the anti-Semitisms and 
Heidegger’s greater philosophy. To read these passages I drew on a variety of his other works 
from a similar time period. I conclude that although the anti-Semitisms are philosophical in 
context, they don’t make the philosophy anti-Semitic in itself. Furthermore, they cannot be 
understood outside the context of his developing historical philosophy, which had begun to 
“turn.” The Notebooks mark a rethinking of concepts he had begun to develop in Being and 
Time, engaging in a self-criticism of the work. Indeed, the anti-Semitisms are written into 
Heidegger’s “turn.” I will argue that passages in the Black Notebooks are anti-Semitic and these 
anti-Semitisms were part of a broader attempt to characterize the decline of the west 
(Abendlands), in which World Jewry played an important role, but was not the underlying cause 
of this declension. In this sense I tried to show that although World Jewry is part of a ‘pervasive’ 
and ‘impalpable’ conspiratorial force, it is not the ultimate concern of his thinking. Likewise 
anti-Semitism is not the philosophical ground of Western decline. The question still remains, 
what does this mean for Heidegger’s thinking? How do we read Heidegger in light of these 
revelations and how do we move forward? 
The third part functions as a conclusion to the project and tries to answer the question of 
what the revelations of anti-Semitism and National Socialism will mean for Heidegger as a 
thinker and his work. I examine some examples of the prominent ways the implications are 
understood, responding to Trawny’s “contamination” argument and Nelly Motroshilova’s 
argument that we should pay attention to some parts of his work and ignore others. Throughout 
! &!
the chapter I use some of Nietzsche’s meditations on the “profound spirit” from Beyond Good 
and Evil, in particular his concept of “masks” to offer a way of understanding scholarly 
interpretations of Heidegger and also as a way of understanding Heidegger’s many faces. I also 
think about the nature of the debate in the internet age and deal with the issue of a prohibition of 
Heidegger’s thinking. Unfortunately the ideas of prohibiting, censoring, or ignoring Heidegger’s 
work have come up many times during this debate and seem to pose a major threat not only to 
our understanding of Heidegger’s work, but to the nature of scholarly engagement with 
controversial, yet vitally important thought. What is at stake is not only whether or not 
Heidegger has a problematic past, but whether we continue to read him. I argue that prohibition 
of his work and division of his thought into acceptable and unacceptable is a misguided way of 
approaching it. Moving forward, even though Heidegger has been revealed as truly controversial 
and problematic, we must keep reading him and critically engaging with his work because there 
is still much to learn. Not only about Heidegger’s thinking itself, but also about the nature of 
historical anti-Semitism (which is much more complicated than we make it seem when we 
equate anti-Semitism with condemnation, true evil) and thought during the Holocaust.  
While the project will not go deeply into the history of the controversy and certainly will 
not provide a definitive reading of passages from the Black Notebooks, what it does do is try to 
come to a preliminary understanding of the anti-Semitic passages and decide whether or not 
these statements truly pose a threat to the legitimacy of Heidegger’s work. I argue that they do 
not. In the end I hope to show that despite the controversial and highly problematic nature of his 
work it is still interesting and fruitful to read. I also hope to show that we should not be hesitant 
to read Heidegger’s work in its historical context, and that this context does not take away from 
its philosophical complexity but makes it all the more rich and complex. I also hope that this 
! '!
work will persuade scholars and professors to consider taking this context into account when 
reading and teaching his work, to choose not ignore or elide his past.  
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Part I: Historicality and National Socialism in Being and Time 
 
 
To understand Heidegger’s affinity for National Socialism one must turn to history—both 
Heidegger’s understanding of history as articulated in Being and Time and the historical context 
in which he found himself writing. To understand what he really meant in Being and Time, we 
must look at the historical context from which the book arose. To understand how he came to the 
decision to involve himself in the National Socialist Revolution, we must reread Being and Time 
because the historical decisionism of the work already contains the seeds of the movement. I will 
attempt to lead the reader through this somewhat circular argument by looking to Heidegger’s 
philosophical concept of Historicality and working through the relationship of its concepts. 
Alongside this exploration I will work back through the history that gives meaning to these 
seemingly abstract concepts. Through this we will find that Being and Time represents a kind 
response to the question of how to live and move forward in the aftermath of World War I. In the 
years that followed its publication, the vision of history contained within the work found its 
factical realization in the promises of the National Socialist Revolution, which according to Karl 
Löwith, for Heidegger can be understood as “a protestational movement of faith.”3  
Out of all the sections and subsections of Being and Time, it is his chapter on 
Historicality that most suggests Heidegger’s later affinity for National Socialism. It is in these 
sections that Heidegger starts to discuss concepts like heritage, tradition (handing down), fate, 
and destiny, whose implications for his vision of historical understanding and authentic living 
already suggest a movement that takes over its heritage and struggles in a community of Volk. 
Furthermore, when this authentic mode of Being is juxtaposed with the description of everyday, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$!Löwith, “The Political Implications,” 178.!
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inauthentic being, it becomes clear against what and whom, this community must struggle—that 
is, every day modern society.  
 
The overall project of Being and Time asks what is the meaning of Being in general. 
Heidegger uses a methodological procedure that looks at different parts of the question and 
conceptualizes them accordingly. The most basic aspect of his task is twofold: to disclose how 
we already understand Being, the phenomenological understanding, which “may be so infiltrated 
with traditional theories and opinions about Being that these remain hidden as sources of the way 
in which it is prevalently understood;”4 and working from this, to exhibit Being in “a way of its 
own, essentially different from the way in which entities are discovered,”5 to give an ontological 
understanding of the way we actually are. In response to these tasks Heidegger analyzes Being 
from the perspective of two modes: the inauthentic, which represents the everyday way of being, 
and the authentic, representing a way of being that is in alignment with his existential-
ontological study of Being. These two modes of Being will mediate the analysis of historicality. 
How this mediation occurs will be discussed later once I lay the groundwork for what 
historicality means in its most basic sense.  
From the beginning the concept of the historical is not merely an afterthought to 
Heidegger’s analysis of Being or a tangent: rather the question of history is the question of 
Being. In this chapter Heidegger’s fundamental thesis is that Dasein is what is primarily 
historical.6 He begins the chapter by remarking that so far, he has only analyzed one horizon of 
Dasein’s existence – death – and states that he must find a way to characterize Dasein in its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 
1965), 25. 
5 Heidegger, Being and Time, 26. '!Heidegger, Being and Time, 428. !
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“Being-a-whole.” Thus he introduces birth as the other factical limit of Dasein’s existence. He 
characterizes the way that Dasein moves between birth and death while maintaining “itself with a 
certain self-sameness” as being stretched along between birth and death. “The specific 
movement in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along, we call its 
‘historizing.’”7 Thus Heidegger characterizes life as ‘historizing.’ “To lay bare the structure of 
historizing, and the existential-temporal conditions of its possibility, signifies that one has 
achieved an ontological understanding of historicality.”8 Thus, “historicality,” the way in which 
Dasein is historical, is constituted by the “structure of historizing” or the ways in which Dasein 
moves through life while holding itself constant. Historicality is the “kind of Being which 
belongs to the historical,” which is rooted in temporality.9 In summary, “the problem of history is 
coextensive with the problem of human existence.”10   
Heidegger investigates this historizing life-movement from the perspective of two modes 
for analysis: authentic and inauthentic historicality. Authentic historicality is the way in which 
Dasein moves through life while holding the self constant, while inauthentic historicality 
describes the way in which average, everyday Dasein moves through life: the way in which 
people “today” conduct themselves. In this mode Dasein is unable to hold the self constant or 
understand its place in history. Furthermore, authentic historicality signifies that one is moving 
through life with respect to the ontological understanding. Regardless of whether Heidegger 
intended for inauthentic and authentic historicality to be interpreted as value judgments, and in 
fact he states that they should not be, the effect is that he paints a picture of the world in which 
there are two ways of being: one that is unable to understand its relation to history and another !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(!Heidegger, Being and Time, 425.  )!Heidegger, Being and Time, 427.!*!Heidegger, Being and Time, 428.!"+!Calvin Schrag, “Heidegger on Repetition and Historical Understanding,” Philosophy East and West 20 (1970), 
278. 
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that is characterized by its ability to disclose, comprehend, and act upon its understanding of 
history to bring about change in the future. In this way these categories cannot be ‘neutral’ 
because it is obvious according to the text that one mode is better than the other. Furthermore, it 
follows that one must ‘choose’ authentic historicality in order to deal with one’s historical 
situation as it is, where the everyday person is lost and distracted. While this consequence is 
evident even in an isolated reading of Being and Time, other possibilities emerge after we read 
Heidegger’s “Rectorship Address,” for example, or the Black Notebooks. This possibility is that 
later authentic historicality could be analogous to the authentic, particularly German Dasein, 
while inauthentic historicality can be analogous to the negative aspects of modernity which are 
espoused by World Jewry, and further the Americans and the Russians. Nevertheless, the values 
created by these opposing concepts can only be fully comprehended by analyzing the various 
components of each concept and their relationship to “Freiberg National Socialism.” Authentic 
historicality can be understood by dividing it into about three general categories, each of which is 
composed of several other concepts, which, through their interactions and combinatory 
meanings, go together signify what Heidegger means by “authentic historicality.” These three 
categories are anticipatory resoluteness (the future); handing down, heritage, and repetition; and 
fate and destiny. Inauthentic historicality is will be discussed in a more cursory way because its 
meaning becomes clear in its opposition to authentic historicality.   
One of the most important aspects of Heidegger’s conception of authentic historizing is 
its orientation toward the future and the future’s role in making the past and the present 
understandable. The futural character of authentic historicality is grounded in death, and thus, in 
anticipatory resoluteness. Anticipatory resoluteness answers the call of conscience that proclaims 
one “Guilty!” Guilty in the sense that one is responsible for a “lack of something in the Dasein of 
! ""!
an Other.”11 Here anticipatory resoluteness already suggests a duty to fix the way Others live, or 
at least a responsibility for the problematic ways that Others live. Understanding the call of 
conscience “means ‘wanting to have a conscience.’”12 Resoluteness is defined as “a projecting of 
oneself upon one’s own Being-guilty—a projecting which is reticent and ready for anxiety.”13 
Further, “Resoluteness gains its authenticity as anticipatory resoluteness.” 14  Anticipatory 
resoluteness is a resoluteness that anticipates Dasein’s death. In this sense it is futurally oriented. 
Dasein looks forward to its own death and comes to terms with the fact that its existence will 
cease. By holding onto this fact the possibilities of life become all the more powerful.  
In this, Dasein understands itself with regard to its potentiality-for-Being, and it 
does so in such a manner that it will go right under the eyes of Death in order thus 
to take over in its thrownness that entity which is itself, and to take it over wholly. 
The resolute taking over of one’s factical ‘there’, signifies, at the same time, that 
the Situation is one which has been resolved upon.15 
 
By Schrag’s analysis, the analytic of Dasein is “an analysis of human finitude in which death 
provides the most decisive index of man’s finite temporality. Human finitude provides the proper 
context for the understanding of history.”16 Schrag notes that while Heidegger does not fully take 
up Hegel’s approach to history, “For both… history becomes a problem through the 
consciousness of crisis. Historical consciousness is grounded in a consciousness of crisis.”17 For 
Heidegger the consciousness of crisis arises from the anticipation of death and historical 
understanding is first grasped at by letting death become “powerful.”  
In Being and Time the consciousness of crisis arises from death. Heidegger chooses to 
interpret death as the ground for historical understanding perhaps because it is the most basic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!""!Heidegger, Being and Time, 328.!"#!Heidegger, Being and Time, 334.!"$!Heidegger, Being and Time, 434.!"%!Heidegger, Being and Time, 434.!"&!Heidegger, Being and Time, 434.!"'!Schrag, “Repetition,” 288.  
17 Schrag, “Repetition,” 288.  
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form of existential crisis from which others arise. However, in the time that Heidegger wrote, it 
was not necessarily only the crisis of one’s ownmost death that seemed to precipitate the need to 
understand one’s place in history, but the very historical situation the world was in: this being the 
aftermath of World War I. Karl Löwith paints a picture of the mood of this time.  
The extraordinary fascination that Spengler, Barth, and Heidegger—despite their 
various divergences—exerted upon a generation of young Germans following the 
First World War derives from a common source. Their shared position can be 
seen in the clear awareness of being situated in a crisis—a turning point between 
epochs; and thus being obliged to confront questions whose nature was too radical 
to find an answer in the enfeebled, nineteenth-century belief in progress, culture, 
and education. The questions that agitated this young generation, devoid of 
illusions, yet sincere, were fundamentally questions of faith.18 
 
Löwith’s essay espouses the difficult tensions and feelings that pervaded at the time. There is the 
question of what to put one’s faith into, what to believe in, now that the older ideas of progress 
had been shattered by Germany’s defeat in World War I and the memory of the millions dead in 
the trenches. Now hope and faith come in the form of the belief that one will make one’s future 
death matter, that it will be in the service of history even though one will not live through it. 
According to Johannes Fritsche’s book Historical Destiny and National Socialism in 
Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’, the translation of “vorlaufendend Entschlossenheit” as 
“anticipatory resoluteness” does not give the full meaning of the German. He argues that John 
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson’s translation of “vorlaufen” as “anticipation” “cleansed” the 
word of its important everyday meaning, which is “to run ahead.”19 “Since ‘to anticipate’ does 
not have the sense of physical motion, the translation forecloses the associations that could 
hardly have been avoided by German readers who “ran into” Heidegger’s phrase in the years 
between World War I and World War II. «Entschlossen in den Tod vorlaufen» (to resolutely run !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!")!Löwith, “The Political Implications,” 172.!"*!Johannes Fritsche, Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger's 'Being and Time,' (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999), 2. 
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ahead into death) was how the acts of those who were later called the “Helden von Langemarck” 
(heroes of Langemarck) were characterized. World War I was the first war characterized largely 
by trench warfare.”20 With the analogy of Trench warfare, running to one’s ownmost death takes 
on a new meaning. Jumping out of the relative safety of the trenches, the soldier runs forward to 
his enemy, into the hail of bullets, to his ownmost death. It is not toward an afterlife that one 
runs, but to the culmination of one’s life in death. This may provide better context to why Carl 
Löwith was critical of the practical implications of the anticipation of death, “In this projection 
toward the imminence of death, the supreme freedom of Dasein as such is affirmed. But when 
one thinks of the thousands of actual suicides committed in Germany after 1933, first, by the 
adversaries and victims of the Third Reich, and later by its defeated representatives, one cannot 
deny that the attitude toward there-being and not-being [Dasein and Nicht-Sein] expressed in 
Heideggerian philosophy has an importance concerning practical consequences for life that cedes 
nothing to the belief in God and immortality.”21 Here we see an example of the ontical Situation, 
the ‘world’ of the time, and how this world’s mood is reflected in the conception of what 
constitutes authentic historicality.  
Once Dasein resolves to take over its thrownness by running ahead to its death it has 
resolved to take over its factical ‘there,’ to take responsibility for, to be in control of its life. 
Dasein makes a resolution. However, Heidegger says that we cannot in this analysis discuss 
“what Dasein factically resolves [upon] in any particular case.” Instead he asks, “whence, in 
general, Dasein can draw upon those possibilities upon which it factically projects itself.”22 He 
answers that one’s anticipatory projection of oneself on death only guarantees that one’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#+!Fritsche, Historical Destiny, 3.!#"!Löwith, “The Political Implications,” 174-175. ##!Heidegger, Being and Time, 434.!
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resolution is authentic, not, again, what it resolves upon. Dasein resolves upon possibilities, its 
potentiality-for-Being. But from whence do these possibilities come? The possibilities which will 
be disclosed do not come from death, but from somewhere else. Heidegger reveals that the 
possibilities come from heritage, handing down, and repetition.  
Heritage is introduced after Heidegger states “those possibilities of existence which have 
been factically disclosed are not to be gathered from death” and rhetorically questions whether 
these authentic possibilities can come from thrownness or something else.23 He shows that these 
possibilities do not come from thrownness because  
As thrown… Proximally and for the most part the Self is lost in the “they”. It 
understands itself in terms of those possibilities of existence which ‘circulate’ in 
the ‘average’ public way of interpreting Dasein today. These possibilities have 
mostly been made unrecognizable by ambiguity; yet they are well known to us.24  
 
The Self is lost in the “they.” To find itself Dasein must disavow the ‘today’ and the ‘they’ and 
seize upon something else for other possibilities to emerge. By resolutely coming back to one’s 
thrownness one realizes the triviality and lostness in which the irresolute navigate the world. By 
resolutely coming back to oneself possibilities are disclosed in what is handed down to one, by 
taking over one’s heritage.  
The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current factical 
possibilities of authentic existing, and discloses them in terms of the heritage [aus 
dem Erbe] which that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over. In one’s coming back 
resolutely to one’s thrownness, there is hidden a handing down [Sich uberliefern] 
to oneself of the possibilities that have come down to one, but not necessarily as 
having thus come down. If everything ‘good’ is a heritage, and the character of 
‘goodness’ lies in making authentic existence possible, then the handing down of 
a heritage constitutes itself in resoluteness. 25  
 
Heritage can be understood in a general sense as good possible ways of existing that have been 
handed down to one from the past. Heritage is good because it is not just possible ways of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#$ Heidegger, Being and Time, 435.!#%!Heidegger, Being and Time, 435!#&!Heidegger, Being and Time, 435.!
! "&!
existing that are handed down, but possible ways that make authentic historizing or authentic 
living possible. Fritsche comments that “Überlieferung,” in this passage written as “a handing 
down [Sich überliefern],” “most often means tradition.”26 When we read “handing down” also as 
“tradition,” more interpretive possibilities arise in English. In the idea of heritage is the idea of a 
lineage that is given to one by birth. One’s birth in a certain place, by certain people, gives one 
this heritage. This is not the only sense of heritage, but can provide context for understanding.  
By taking over one’s heritage a tradition comes down to oneself. Thus it is through heritage and 
through tradition that one discovers possibilities of existing that will make authentic existing 
possible. In this vision of historical understanding, one must turn away from the ‘they’, away 
from the “’average’ public way of interpreting Dasein today,” and turn towards ways of existing 
that worked in the past, in traditions that are a part of one’s heritage.  
When Fritsche comments that “Uberlieferung” “most often means tradition,” he 
continues, “and the loss of tradition was what haunted German intellectuals between World War 
I and World War II—and by no means only them.”27 Thus we begin to see that Heidegger is 
perhaps concerned with the loss of tradition, its loss being exemplified in the way the ‘they’ 
exist, in the modern distractedness and lostness. Fritsche writes “For conservatives, this 
destruction of Uberlieferung took place in the parliament of Weimar and in the big cities, notably 
Berlin, with their night-bars, with all their different sorts of strange Mickey Mouses, with 
“Asphalt-Literaten” (“asphalt writers”) and “Neger-Jazz” (“nigger-jazz”), and, of course, with 
social democrats and communists and Jews.”28 The loss or destruction of tradition was an issue 
that conservative thinkers (among many others) saw playing out on a large scale throughout 
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modern society. A more liberal thinker Walter Benjamin interpreted the works of modern artists 
like Paul Klee “as efforts ‘to get rid of experience.’” Fritsche comments that “to get rid of 
experience is the new ‘dream of human beings today,’ one we can dream of only by reading 
‘Micky Mouse.’”29 Benjamin’s idea of the modern as trying ‘to get rid of experience’ by 
dreaming (of distractions like Mickey Mouse) is a kind of forgetting or trying to forget one’s 
situation. Heidegger’s work Being and Time itself attempts to tackle the issue of the 
forgottenness of Being. He traces the forgottenness of Being throughout the history of 
metaphysics back to the Greeks, but also locates it factically in the way that modern people today 
exist in the world. Thus Heidegger posits heritage and tradition as a way of combating the 
forgottenness of Being that is pervasive in the modern world. In his attention to the problem of 
the loss of tradition we see that Heidegger is part of a cast of conservative thinkers who were 
concerned with this problem.  
Heidegger builds upon the ideas of heritage and tradition with the concept of repetition. 
While repetition is not discussed until after he gives definitions of the concepts of fate and 
destiny, it makes much more sense to explain them in this order. The action of repeating, or more 
accurately, of ‘fetching again’ possibilities, is the primary way by which Dasein begins to 
understand the relationship between past possibilities and the way they are useful in the present. 
It is also the primordial action by which heritage and tradition are passed down to oneself. While 
repetition does not seem to have any connection to National Socialism, its function with tradition 
as handing down and with resoluteness makes it key to this understanding. 
The resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, then becomes 
the repetition of a possibility of existence that has come down to us. Repeating is 
handing down explicitly—that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the 
Dasein that has-been-there. The authentic repetition of a possibility of existence !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#*!Fritsche, Historical Destiny, 15!
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that has been—the possibility that Dasein may choose its hero—is grounded 
existentially in anticipatory resoluteness; for it is in resoluteness that one first 
chooses the choice which makes one free for the struggle of loyally following in 
the footsteps of that which can be repeated.30  
 
 The passage says the act of resolutely coming back to itself and handing itself down is in itself 
an act of repetition. Thus “Repeating is handing down explicitly” could say that repeating is 
upholding tradition. Heidegger says that authentic repetition is the possibility that Dasein may 
choose its hero—resolutely making the choice to repeat is choosing a hero—choosing to make 
tradition (past possibilities) its hero. That is, one makes oneself free to struggle to ‘loyally 
follow’ the footsteps of tradition. By running forward to one’s ownmost death, one chooses to 
make the good possibilities that arise from tradition its hero and to loyally follow it. It is by 
loyally struggling to uphold this hero that Dasein can ensure this possibility will be repeated in 
the future. The fact that Heidegger suggests authentic living is a choice to loyally follow a hero, 
a tradition, makes the fact that Heidegger chose to loyally follow a hero which represented the 
renewal of German greatness and tradition seem much more in character with his philosophy; the 
fact that Heidegger “chose” Hitler does not seem so implausible. It also prefigures his thought in 
the Rectorship Address, which is concerned with the relationship between the leader and his 
followers.  
The concept of repetition is further elaborated as disclosure and understanding of the 
historical situation of today with aid from the concept of the moment of vision [Augenblick] and 
the disavowal of the today.  
Arising, as it does, from a resolute projection of oneself, repetition does not let 
itself be persuaded of something by what is ‘past’, just in order that this, as 
something which was formerly actual, may recur. Rather the repetition makes a 
reciprocative rejoinder to the possibility of that existence which has-been-there. 
But when such a rejoinder is made to this possibility in a resolution, it is made in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$+!Heidegger, Being and Time, 437.!
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a moment of vision; and as such it is at the same time a disavowal of that which in 
the “today”, is working itself out as the ‘past’.31  
 
Here the sense of repetition not only as repeating or fetching again becomes apparent. When one 
goes back to possibilities from heritage that might be repeated, one is in conversation with the 
past. As Macquarrie and Robinson’s note suggests, the past “proposes certain possibilities for 
adoption,” which Dasein then reciprocates by making a rejoinder to the proposal.32 In the 
moment of vision Dasein sees perhaps the incompatibility of the possibility offered by the past 
and the way people live in the “today.” Dasein sees that the today is not the inevitable end or 
way of living that has come down from the past. Dasein disavows the today, that is it must 
disavow, refuse to live in the distracted, ambiguous, traditionless way that is ubiquitous in its 
modern time and find its own way that has come down in heritage.   
 Fate is the culmination of the characteristics of authentic living. It is first defined right 
after Heidegger introduces heritage and handing down (tradition). He writes,  
Only Being free for death, gives Dasein its goal outright and pushes existence into 
its finitude. Once one has grasped the finitude of one’s existence, it snatches one 
back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as 
closest to one—those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly—and 
brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate [Schicksals]. This is how we designate 
Dasein’s primordial historizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which 
Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has 
inherited and yet chosen. 33 
 
The realization of one’s finitude snatches one back from the confusion of the “endless 
multiplicity of possibilities” that arise from inauthentic living and shows Dasein the simplicity of 
its fate. This fate “is how we designate Dasein’s primordial historizing”—that is, fate is 
characterized as the most originary and closest to Being way of moving through life. Fate is the 
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“authentic resoluteness which hands itself down to itself in a possibility it has inherited and yet 
chosen.” Fate is coming back to oneself and choosing to look for possibilities of existing in what 
one has inherited. Living fatefully is living to reintroduce and uphold tradition. Following this 
passage Heidegger elaborates,  
Dasein can be reached by the blows of fate only because in the depths of its Being 
Dasein is fate in the sense we have described. Existing fatefully in the 
resoluteness which hands itself down, Dasein has been disclosed as Being-in-the-
world both for the ‘fortunate’ circumstances which ‘come its way’ and for the 
cruelty of accidents. Fate does not first arise from the clashing together of events 
and circumstances. Even one who is irresolute gets driven about by these—more 
so than one who has chose; and yet he can ‘have’ no fate.34 
 
Heidegger reminds us that his concept of fate is not fate in the ordinary sense, not the 
accumulation of events. One who is irresolute can have no fate. The irresolute is caught up in the 
trade and traffic of today, it has no concern with the meaning of its death, it does not choose to 
uphold its tradition or heritage as it is blind to it. Fate is not given to everyone, but is a mode of 
historizing that is authentic. It is a mode in which Dasein chooses to confront its death and to 
uphold tradition. Heidegger writes that existing in the mode of fate is being historical in the very 
depths of Dasein’s existence.35 That is, existing in this mode as being free for death and 
repeating possibilities (tradition) which it has inherited is the way in which Dasein is truly 
historical. By choosing to represent authentic historicality as fate [Schicksal] Heidegger gives it 
the sense that this way of living is unavoidable or one is bound to it.  
 Destiny develops the idea of fate, but describes the way in which groups of people, not 
just individuals, are gathered in the mode of fate. The passage on destiny is extremely important 
because it creates the possibility that a group of people can exist authentically together, perhaps a 
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group like the National Socialist Movement. It is also significant in Heidegger’s discussion of 
World Jewry in the Black Notebooks.  
But if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with 
Others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny 
[Geschick]. This is how we designate the historizing of the community 
[Gemeinschaft], of a people [Volk]. Destiny is not something that puts itself 
together out of individual fates, any more than Being-with-one-another can be 
conceived as the occurring together of several Subjects. Our fates have already 
been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in 
our resoluteness for definite possibilities. Only in communicating and in 
struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein’s fateful destiny in and 
with its ‘generation’ goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein.36  
 
Every Dasein, but especially fateful Dasein does not live alone, but is essentially Being-with 
Others. Thus Dasein’s fateful historizing is a historizing that it does with others as people move 
through life alongside one another. Authentic historizing with others is designated as destiny. 
Destiny is the historizing of of a community, of a people. Destiny is not simply the combination 
of individual fates. “Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one 
another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities.” Our fates are guided 
in advance because of the way people live in the same world (the issues of the particular world 
affect everyone in it) and because of our “resoluteness for definite possibilities.” This seems to 
suggest that fates that are guided together become destiny because the fateful Daseins have 
resolved on the same possibilities that they have decided will become definite. That is, perhaps, 
these fateful Daseins (by definition) have all chosen to follow the possibilities that have arisen 
from a shared heritage, a shared tradition, especially because they are a community. Only in 
communicating with other fateful Daseins and by struggling—and one must struggle against 
something, against the loss of tradition, the distractedness and lostness of the everyday—does the 
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power of destiny become free. Finally, Heidegger defines destiny, “in and with its ‘generation’,” 
as the full authentic historizing of Dasein.  
 Fritsche addresses this passage as well and pays attention to the ideas of community 
[Gemeinschaft], Volk, and destiny [Geschick] (where destiny is the fateful historizing of a 
community of Volk), and their relationship to right-wing discourse of the 1920s.  
In right-wing discourse, the notion of Vorsehhung (providence) is related to 
Schicksal (fate) and Geschick (destiny). Gesellschaft, Gemeinschaft, Volk, 
Volksgemeinschaft, Geschick, Schicksal, Vorsehung—each of these concepts has 
its specific history in which it acquired different meanings and polemical 
functions. However, in the 1910s and 1920s a peculiar constellation of these 
notions emerged that was exclusively used by authors on the political Right… In 
the first two decades of this century, authors were “politically Right” if they 
explicitly argued against (classical) liberals and if, at the same time, they also 
argued against leftist authors… For social democrats as well as for liberals the 
development of society—the enormous advance of the means of production in 
capitalist economy and the progress of parliamentary democracy—was a step 
upward and forward. For right-wingers, however, this advance was actually a fall, 
even a downward plunge, that had to be “corrected” by cancelling society 
[Gesellschaft] and by rerealizing community [Gemeinschaft]. 37 
 
Heidegger’s use of these terms, as well as other concepts that have already been discussed, 
places his rhetoric firmly within the right wing belief that the problems posed by modern society 
must be struggled against by revitalizing community [Gemeinschaft] as opposed to modern 
society [Gesellschaft]. Fritsche goes on to compare it with Hiter’s use of fate [Schicksal] in Mein 
Kampf (1927). 
There is no choice, for I can’t not do what is my duty. This in no way diminishes 
the greatness of the individual—quite the contrary. Obeying the call proves the 
greatness of the person who is capable of recognizing the enormous duty to save 
the Germans and the entire world. Only a coward, or an inauthentic Dasein, shies 
away from the task fate has ordered him to carry out. Obeying the call, however, 
is also already the first step toward the rerealization of the Aryan race, for the 
strong sense of duty and the willingness to sacrifice oneself for the community of 
the people and the race are both indications and effects of the superiority of the 
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Aryan race, whose political domination over the entire world has to be 
reestablished (e.g., MKe 296ff.; MK 325ff.).38 
 
Although Heidegger and Hitler’s rhetoric is remarkably similar, this does not necessarily suggest 
that Heidegger was working from Hitler’s ideas or that their formulations were the same. 
However, it does show that both were working within the same conservative right-wing rhetoric 
that was prevalent at the time. Further, this similarity suggests the compatibility between 
Heidegger’s historical thought in Being and Time, and his political decision to involve himself 
with the National Socialist Movement.  
To complete the picture of the precursor to National Socialism in Being and Time, the 
character of inauthentic historicality must be examined. Heidegger’s description of the 
inauthentic is not separated from the historical situation of the 1920s in Europe, but clearly is a 
critical description, a diagnosis, of the problematic way that modern man lives. In contrast to the 
way that authentic historicality is constantly in the process of renegotiating the past and 
projecting what it wants in the future, inauthentic, everyday historicality is lost in the bustle of 
daily affairs and tries to understand itself in terms of its progress in work.   
When we are with one another in public, the Others are encountered in activity of 
such a kind that one is ‘in the swim’ with it ‘oneself’. One is acquainted with it, 
discusses it, encourages it, combats it, retains it, and forgets it, but one always 
does so primarily with regard to what is getting done and what is ‘going to come 
of it’. We compute the progress which the individual Dasein has made—his 
stoppages, readjustments, and ‘output’; and we do so proximally in terms of that 
with which he is concerned—its course, its status, its changes, its availability.39 
 
Inauthentic historicality becomes lost in trying to pull together its complex web of daily affairs. 
If everyday Dasein does try to understand its circumstances, instead of repeating possibilities, “it 
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first computes itself.”40 Because of this it does not care about the ‘past,’ what matters is the 
‘today.’ But in focusing on the today, everyday Dasein does not have access to all the good 
things that come down to one in heritage. Throughout Heidegger’s description of inauthentic 
historicality he brings up its relationship to calculation and computation. While in Being and 
Time his attention to calculation is not very pronounced and he does not spend very much time 
analyzing it, in the Black Notebooks and in later works calculativeness in its relationship to 
machination becomes a major focus; indeed, it is also a defining characteristic of World Jewry. 
While I do not spend very much time analyzing calculation in this part of the project, it will be 
discussed in more depth in the next part. 
 Descriptions of inauthentic historicality are characterized by confusion, loss of memory, 
blindness, and a dependence upon the “modern” to understand its situation.  
In inauthentic historicality, on the other hand, the way in which fate has been 
primordially stretched along has been hidden…In awaiting the next new thing, it 
has already forgotten the old one. The “they” evades choice. Blind for 
possibilities, it cannot repeat what has been, but only retains and receives the 
‘actual’ that is left over... Lost in the making present of the “today”, it understands 
the ‘past’ in terms of the ‘Present’. On the other hand, the temporality of authentic 
historicality, as the moment of vision of anticipatory repetition, deprives the 
“today” of its character as present, and weans one from the conventionalities of 
the “they”. When, however, one’s existence is inauthentically historical, it is 
loaded down with the legacy of a ‘past’ which has become unrecognizable, and it 
seeks the modern.41  
 
Inauthentic historicality is characterized as being unable to understand its historical situation. 
Furthermore this Dasein does not choose to take over its life, but is “lost in the making present of 
the ‘today.’” It cannot see or imagine other possibilities of living. It does not choose to look into 
its heritage, as it is caught up “in awaiting the next new thing” having “already forgotten the old 
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one.” While authentic historicality incorporates the past into its future and present, inauthentic 
Dasein is “loaded down with the legacy of a ‘past’” which it does not understand or even 
recognize. This ‘past’ could be read as many things: the past greatness of Germany, which its 
inauthentic generation does not understand or want; or the past as heritage or tradition that holds 
a community together. Because inauthentic historically passively disavows the past, forgets it, it 
seeks and upholds “the modern”—what is ‘great’ about the present. Notably, “the modern” is 
only used in descriptions of inauthentic historicality. This can easily be read as a criticism of 
liberal modern society, which is caught up in capitalist production and only concerned with its 
‘progress,’ while for Heidegger modernity has not shown progress, but only declension. 
 Lastly, we can see the juxtaposition between authentic and inauthentic historicality 
simply in the way that the two modes deal with death and the crisis that should arise thereby. 
“Our lostness in the “they” and the world-historical has earlier been revealed as a fleeing in the 
face of death.”42 While authentic historicality runs ahead towards its death, projecting itself upon 
its ownmost possibility, inauthentic being “flees” from death, signaling its cowardice, whereas 
authentic is heroic and loyal. The modern, cowardly, irresolute, and confused mode of being in 
inauthentic historicality, which shirks its possibilities and forgets or ignores its heritage, is the 
image of what Heidegger perceived in many sectors of society and probably assumed was the 
case in other countries as well. This is his diagnosis of the present. Heidegger’s later comments 
about Americans, Bolsheviks, and Jews in the Black Notebooks and other places indicate that 
they would easily fit into this picture of inauthentic historicality. Furthermore, Jews and many 
other people living in Germany who fall into this category or could not be deemed fit to become 
authentic would have no place in the authentic community of struggling Volk that Heidegger !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!%#!Heidegger, Being and Time, 442.!!
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envisioned. While when I first began to read Being and Time this description of problematic 
ways of modern living struck me as an uncannily true description of the problems of modern 
capitalist living that I encounter in my time, I began to realize that its implications in justifying 
the political actions of a societal takeover cannot be overlooked.  
 By comparing my analysis of historicality in Being and Time with information other 
writers have provided about the concerns and rhetoric of thinkers in Post World War I Germany, 
I have tried to show that Heidegger’s historical thought is compatible with his decision to join 
the National Socialist Movement; furthermore, without the historical context many possible 
meanings are elided.  Authentic historicality has been disclosed as a way of understanding one’s 
historical Situation in terms of heritage, tradition, and repetition as fate. The concern with the 
loss of tradition and the struggle to build a community places his thought in line with right-wing 
thinkers at the time. Because of this, more investigation into Heidegger’s earlier work in context 
with this conservative movement of thinkers is called for. Inauthentic historicality has been 
interpreted as Heidegger’s diagnosis of the hegemonic ways of being in the modern world that 
contribute to the forgottenness of Being. It is unable to integrate or understand its relationship to 
history and so seeks the modern and attempts to calculate its progress. In this way inauthentic 
historicality seems to be continuous with what Heidegger will later characterize in the Black 
Notebooks as “the historyless.” While probably not every conservative thinker at the time joined 
the Nazi Party, Heidegger eventually did. This is to say that while his conservative thinking 
alone is not enough to support a National Socialist reading of Being and Time, his later 
involvement with the movement compounded with his right-wing tendencies makes the 
possibility of my National Socialist reading sufficient.  
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Part II: World Jewry in Heidegger’s Schwarze Hefte 
 
Martin Heidegger was elected Rectorate of the University of Freiburg on April 21, 1933, 
and on May 1, joined the Nazi Party. He offered his resignation a year later on April 23, 1934, 
but remained a member of the faculty and the party until the end of World War II. Ever since, 
there has been controversy as to what his affiliation with National Socialism means for 
Heidegger as a thinker and for his philosophical thought. Last year, a new source was finally 
published consisting of the first three volumes of Heidegger’s Black Notebooks or Schwarze 
Hefte, as he called them, which contain his personal notes from the years 1931-1941. Heidegger 
had stipulated before his death on May 26th, 1976, that they be published last, only after all his 
other works had been published. While the three published volumes are twelve hundred pages 
long, twelve volumes have been planned that will contain Heidegger’s writing into the 1970s. 
Although these three volumes are only a small portion of the writing to come, they can provide 
insight into his private thoughts during the controversial period in which Heidegger was a 
member of the National Socialist Party. The notebooks confirm that Heidegger has made anti-
Semitic remarks, although only a small portion of the writing was about Jews. However, these 
relatively few anti-Semitic remarks have prompted a reassessment and reinterpretation of the 
philosophical implications of his earlier works. These passages first prompted me to reread 
Heidegger’s discussion of historicality in Being and Time, in which I found a much deeper 
affinity for National Socialism than I had previously imagined. It became clear in reading 
Heidegger’s anti-Semitic remarks that they were inextricably connected with Heidegger’s greater 
philosophizing about history and his time. These passages raise the question, what role in world 
history did Heidegger believe Jewry played and how is this related to his philosophy? A further 
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question that has been asked by many is, does Heidegger’s anti-Semitism contaminate his 
philosophy in any way? This can only be answered after the philosophy surrounding his anti-
Semitism is laid out. I use Being and Time along with other documents, such as lectures, from 
the period of WWII as my primary tool for interpretation of the passages. In this investigation I 
argue that for Heidegger, world Jewry was the paragon of an inauthentic community that has 
absorbed the destructive essence of modernity and which plays a major role in this turning point 
in world history. However, it is not suggested that world Jewry is the underlying cause of 
world’s current crisis, but is one of many historical actors and tendencies that are contributing to 
the forgottenness of Being and decline of the West. 
In order to give a better context of what the Black Notebooks are, I would first like to turn 
to Nelly Motroshilova’s essay “On Heidegger’s Black Notebooks: Or, Why Has the Publication 
of Volumes 94-96 of Martin Heidegger’s Collected Works Caused a Sensation.” She describes 
several sensations, having to do with Heidegger’s criticism of “vulgar” National Socialism while 
developing his own “genuine” National Socialism, how the anti-Semitic ideas are “clearly, and 
even with an enthusiasm, written into the decline of the West (Abendlands) in modern time,” and 
lastly, what this means for Heidegger’s fate.43 However, she also points out how the work as a 
whole provides the first instance and chronological development of Heidegger’s “turn” towards a 
new philosophy of Being, his “turn” (Kehre) away from Dasein towards Sein and Seyn. She 
writes,  
His Black Notebooks allow us to trace when he began to self-criticize his work, 
what caused this self-criticism, and what its consequences are. It can be said in 
advance that everything is tied to Heidegger’s reevaluation of his former doctrine 
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of Being centered on Dasein (and the whole set of categories of Being and 
Time).44  
 
These ideas were part of “a multistage evolutionary process” in which, among other changes, 
there was “the emergence of a general outline of Seynsgeschichtliche, that is, the “historical” 
concept of Being [as Seyn].”45 Thus, it is within this context of an evolving self-criticism, a 
continual reworking of the ideas first raised in Being and Time, and an attempt to describe the 
decline of the West in these terms that we must contextualize Heidegger’s passages on World 
Jewry.  It should be noted that while many of the concepts from Being and Time that I discussed 
in the previous chapter appear in these passages, they appear in a changed form.  
One preliminary question that must be answered is what kind of anti-Semitism appears in 
the Black Notebooks? Are Heidegger’s comments really anti-Semitic at all? He does not ascribe 
to the biological racism that was prevalent during the day and is pointedly against it. However, 
his characterizations of Jewry always harken back to a few culturally-held stereotypes of 
calculativeness and rationality, but do not venture much further beyond them. The implications 
of his statements also gain their meaning from his broader philosophical ideas. Recently, Peter 
Trawny, the editor of the Notebooks, has argued that it is in fact a “philosophical” anti-Semitism. 
I agree with this, but am hesitant to claim that Heidegger has made a philosophy of anti-
Semitism. Neither could I say that Heidegger’s overall philosophy is anti-Semitic itself. So, we 
return again to the question of whether Heidegger’s statements about Jewry anti-Semitic. I argue 
that they are. Nowhere does Heidegger write about a Jewish person as an individual with unique 
strengths or flaws. Instead, every Jew becomes representative of the broader ‘type,’ every 
characteristic is taken not as one’s own, but only as a greater symbol of one’s Jewishness. This is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!%%!Motroshilova, “On Heidegger’s Black Notebooks,” 75.!%&!Motroshilova, “On Heidegger’s Black Notebooks,” 79-80.!!
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evidenced in several passages where Heidegger discusses Pavel Litvinov, Freud, and most 
notably, Husserl. These anti-Semitisms stem from the broader culture of that was prevalent 
during the day, from Nazi propaganda, and also from the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. 
However, whether Heidegger’s remarks are anti-Semitic cannot itself condemn his philosophy 
when we consider how anti-Semitism was not simply a mark of the evil Nazi, but was 
participated in even by those who were trying to argue against anti-Semitism. For example, 
Sartre’s Anti-Semite and Jew: An Exploration of the Etiology of Hate, first published in 1946. 
While attempting to defend the Jew from anti-Semitism he actually partakes in those stereotypes. 
Thus, I believe that it is not the burden of this investigation to show whether or not these ideas 
are anti-Semitic because, for the most part, the whole of white Western society was anti-Semitic 
at that time. When we read these passages today, it is from a very different perspective that only 
arose after World War II and white Western culture’s general acceptance of Jewish people as 
“white,” no longer ‘oriental nomads’ or ‘foreigners.’ Rather, the burden of this investigation is to 
show what historical role Heidegger believed World Jewry played and how this relates to his 
philosophy. 
The first passages I want to discuss deal with the conspiratorial nature of World Jewry 
that point towards the influence of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion in Heidegger’s thought.  
He describes Jewry in a way that is consistent with the way Jews are represented in the Protocols 
as calculating, extremely rational, greedy for money and power, as well as in some way mystical 
and extreme. Although there is no reason to believe Heidegger agreed with every word of the 
Protocols, it is not far-fetched to grant that he accepted their basic premise: that there is a 
dangerous Jewish world conspiracy. Peter Trawny argues this as well. 
In addition, I was criticized for the thesis that Heidegger’s anti-Semitism was at 
least influenced by the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion”. It was and is objected, 
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that Heidegger had not read and did not know the “Protocols”. This pseudo-
philological argument is the same as saying that the only one who read Hitler’s 
“Mein Kampf” could be a Nazi. This would immediately reduce the number of 
Nazis during the “Third Reich” to a pretty small number. I do not claim that 
Heidegger read the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion”. He could have been under 
their influence, just as anyone who heard (of) Hitler’s speeches was under their 
influence.46  
 
This first passage illustrates how Heidegger characterized World Jewry. It shows that he in some 
way partook in the propaganda of Jewish conspiracy that was widely circulated at the time. Here, 
Heidegger complains that even though World Jewry is powerful and pervasive, it doesn’t have to 
sacrifice its people in war, while Germans must fight and die. He betrays a belief that Jewry is 
getting the better end of the bargain.  
World Jewry, incited by emigrants allowed to leave Germany, is pervasive and 
impalpable, and even though its power is widely spread, it doesn’t need to 
participate in military actions, whereas all that remains to us is to sacrifice the 
best blood of our own people.47  
  
Here, Jewry echoes with conspiratorial force. It is “pervasive and impalpable” a secret 
underlying force that cannot be pinpointed, apparently incited by emigrants “allowed” to leave 
Germany. This passage illustrates the sense of the pervasiveness of conspiratorial Jewish power 
that unfairly does not have to shed blood. It is important to recall that this statement does not 
make sense outside of a nationalistic context. The influence of the Protocols is even more 
prevalent in the following passage, where Heidegger further characterizes Jewry as a massive, 
secret, conspiratorial force.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!%'!!Peter Trawny, Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung, (Germany: Klostermann RoteReihe, 
2015), 138. Translation by Thomas N. Delmer, letter to author, April 15, 2015.!%(!Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe IV. Abteilung: Hinweise und Aufzeichnungen Band 96 Überlegungen XII-XV 
(Schwarze Hefte 1939-1941), ed. Peter Trawny, (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2014), 262, quoted in Greg 
Johnson, “Heidegger on World Jewry in the Black Notebooks,” last modified March 29, 2014, http://www.counter-
currents.com/2014/03/heidegger-on-world-jewry-in-the-black-notebooks/. !
! $"!
One of the most secret forms of the gigantic [Riesigen], and perhaps the oldest, is 
the tenacious skillfulness in calculating, hustling, and intermingling through 
which the worldlessness of Jewry is grounded.48  
 
Here we read: the worldlessness of Jewry is grounded in the skill of calculating, hustling, and 
intermingling which is an old, secret form of the “gigantic.” Jewry as old, secret, and gigantic 
follows the themes of the Protocols very nicely. It is a force that is unseen. The concept of the 
“gigantic” is a term that appears later in the essay “The Age of the World Picture,” but refers to 
something different from World Jewry, but still related to calculativeness.  
The gigantic is rather that through which the quantitative becomes a special 
quality and thus a remarkable kind of greatness… But as soon as the gigantic in 
planning and calculating and adjusting and making secure shifts over out the 
quantitative and becomes a special quality, then what is gigantic, and what can 
seemingly always be calculated completely, becomes, precisely through this, 
incalculable.”49  
 
The gigantic is said to be a sign of the “fundamental event of the modern age[,] the 
conquest of the world as picture.”50 Thus we see that Jewry is grounded in some tendency 
for calculativeness that is characteristic of the modern age and forms part of the gigantic. 
The statement that Jewry is worldless may have several possible philosophical 
implications when reading it from the perspective of Being and Time. To understand what 
Heidegger means by the “worldessness” of “World Jewry” will further our understanding 
of the historical situation he describes.  
In the section on history and historicality in Being and Time Dasein is always already 
within-the-world and a part of worlds. That Jewry is worldless could mean that Jewry is un-
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Dasein and un-human. What lacks a world, such as animals and stones, lacks one because they 
cannot have a history. Heidegger’s thesis of Part II, Section V, is that Dasein is historical. Rocks 
and animals become historical by being a part of Dasein’s world, incorporated into its concern.51 
Further, if Jewry is ‘worldless,’ it is also historyless. Heidegger’s passages confirm that Jewry is 
also considered historyless in this philosophy.  However, if we broaden our interpretation of 
what worldless may mean beyond the context of how worlds are described in his writing on 
historicality, its meaning may become more clear.  
 In one of the passages of Heidegger’s lecture course, published under the title of Nature, 
History, State, he discusses homeland, peoplehood, and folklore. In this context he makes a 
remark about Jewish people.  
…From the specific knowledge of a people about the nature of its space, we first 
experience how nature is revealed in this people. For a Slavic people, the nature 
of our German space would definitely be revealed differently from the way it is 
revealed to us; to Semitic nomads, it will perhaps never be revealed at all. This 
way of being embedded in a people, situated in a people, this original 
participation in the knowledge of a people, cannot be taught; at most, it can be 
awakened from its slumber. One poor means of doing this is folklore…[my 
emphasis].52 
 
This quote at least suggests that Jewish people are incapable of experiencing or understanding 
the nature of “German space,” the ‘world’ arises from the environment and from folklore. Jews 
here are referred to negatively as nomads, they do not belong to a particular place. He suggests 
that they cannot fit into a German landscape, they cannot have this “original participation in the 
knowledge of [the German] people,” because “it cannot be taught,” because it arises from 
something else, perhaps what Heidegger often refers to as ‘rootedness in the soil.’ Later in this 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!&"!Heidegger, Being and Time, 432.!&#!Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, Nature, History, State: 1933-1934 (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 
56.!
! $$!
passage Heidegger refers to the way that nomads have often left wastelands where they found 
rich cultivated fields.  
History teaches us that nomads have not only been made nomadic by the 
desolation of wastelands and steppes, but they also often left wastelands behind 
them where they found fruitful and cultivated land—and that human beings who 
are rooted in the soil have known how to make a home for themselves even in the 
wilderness.53  
 
Heidegger displays a prejudice towards nomads that used to be used more readily in 
discrimination against Jewish people, but today is expressed across Europe and beyond mostly as 
prejudice against the Roma people, who are generally referred to by the derogatory term, 
“Gypsies.” What I am trying to suggest here is that when Heidegger characterizes Jewry as 
“worldless” he may be referring to the way that they, at this time, have neither a ‘state,’ nor a 
particular soil to which they are tied. Heidegger may be suggesting that Jewry should not have a 
place in the particular world of the ‘German homeland,’ and furthermore, perhaps that it should 
not have a place anywhere. However, if we recall that Heidegger was still working on “essential” 
analyses and descriptions, he may not be suggesting whether or not Jewry should have a place in 
the ‘world,’ but that Jewry is in an essential condition in which it does not belong to any 
particular place or world. Still, we must remember that in the “gigantic” passage this 
“worldlessness” was grounded some tendency for calculativeness, so its meaning is probably 
broader than simply the fact that Jewry ‘lacks a home.’ 
In the Notebooks it is not only Jewry that is historyless, but it is a state that modernity 
itself is in. The following passage exemplifies the crisis Heidegger believes the world to be in 
and can be best understood in terms of his Being-historical thinking.  
What is happening now is the end of the history of the great inception of 
Occidental humanity, in which inception humanity was called to the guardianship !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!&$!Fried and Polt, Nature, History, State, 55.!!
! $%!
of be-ing, only to transform this calling right away into the pretension to re-
present beings in their machinational unessence…  
In the historyless, that which belongs together only within it also comes 
most readily into the unity of complete mixture; apparent construction and 
renovation, and complete destruction—both are the same—the groundless—what 
has succumbed to mere beings and is alienated from be-ing. As soon as the 
historyless has ‘set in,’ ‘historicism’ begins to run rampant; the groundless, in the 
most diverse and contradictory forms, falls—without recognizing itself as having 
the same unessence—into the most extreme enmity and craving for destruction…  
And maybe in this ‘struggle’— which struggles over goallessness itself 
and which hence can be only the caricature of “struggle”—the greater 
groundlessness will ‘triumph,’ which is bound to nothing and makes everything 
serviceable to itself (Jewry). But the authentic triumph, the triumph of history 
over the historyless, is won only where the groundless excludes itself because it 
does not venture be-ing, but instead always merely calculates with beings, and 
posits its calculations as what is real.54  
 
 Heidegger situates his time at a turning point in the history of Being, “What is happening 
now…” For Heidegger the history of Being begins with the Greeks, who started to write and 
think about the essential question of Being. However, once Plato has arrived, the question was 
forgotten. Heidegger would probably agree that the rest of the history of Being up until now is a 
narrative of declension and degeneration that reaches its crux in the modern period. At this crux, 
or turning point, Heidegger sees a decision, a choice, a possibility, to change the course of the 
world towards something better and more authentic, that “loyally” follows the question of Being 
and “struggles” to make itself authentic against the machinational power of the historyless. This 
is also what Heidegger argues in Being and Time, that today the question of the meaning of 
Being has been forgotten. His task is to bring it back to the fore. However, due to Western 
metaphysics, the question is transformed into “the pretension to re-present beings in their 
machinational unessence,” to turn beings into numbers, objects, resources, ready for 
implementation and optimization. In the second paragraph he says that even the “apparent 
construction and renovation, and complete destruction” are the same. That is to say that any !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!&% Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe 95, 96-97, quoted in “7 New Translated Excerpts.” !
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reworking of traditional metaphysics or even the complete destruction of it are the same in that 
they are already “groundless,” already having “succumbed to mere beings” and “alienated from 
being.”   
In the third paragraph Heidegger refers to the “struggle” in single and double quotation 
marks. “Struggle” is suspended this way to indicate that it is an inauthentic “struggle,” a parody 
of “the struggle” that Heidegger writes about in his lecture series “On the Essence of Truth” in 
the winter semester of 1933-1934. In a section titled “The saying of Heraclitus. Struggle as the 
essence of beings” he characterizes struggle in terms of confrontation and an enemy:  
…the struggle of pojlemoV, war… Struggle [Kampf] as standing against the 
enemy, or more plainly: standing firm in confrontation. 
 An enemy is each and every person who poses an essential threat to the 
Dasein of the people and its individual members. The enemy does not have to be 
external, and the external enemy is not even always the more dangerous one. And 
it can seem as if there were no enemy. Then it is a fundamental requirement to 
find the enemy, to expose the enemy to the light, or even first to make the enemy, 
so that this standing against the enemy may happen and so that Dasein may not 
lose its edge [my emphasis]. 
The enemy can have attached itself to the innermost roots of the Dasein of 
a people and can set itself against this people’s own essence and act against it. 
The struggle is all the fiercer and harder and tougher, for the least of it consists in 
coming to blows with one another; it is often far more difficult and wearisome to 
catch sight of the enemy as such, to bring the enemy into the open, to harbor no 
illusions about the enemy, too keep oneself ready for attack, to cultivate and 
intensify a constant readiness and to prepare the attack looking far ahead with the 
goal of total annihilation.55  
 
This is the authentic struggle, the one that Heidegger finds necessary to teach his students about. 
Heidegger continues “And maybe in this ‘struggle’— which struggles over goallessness itself 
and which hence can be only the caricature of “struggle”—the greater groundlessness will 
‘triumph,’ which is bound to nothing and makes everything serviceable to itself (Jewry).”56 
Maybe in this caricature of “struggle,” Jewry—“the greater groundlessness”—will triumph. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!&&!Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, trans., Being and Truth (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2010), 73.!&'!Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe 95, 96-97, quoted in “7 New Translated Excerpts.” !
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However, he says, “the authentic triumph, the triumph of history over the historyless, is won 
only where the groundless excludes itself because it does not venture be-ing, but instead always 
merely calculates with beings, and posits its calculations as what is real.” In other words, the 
authentic triumph is won where “the groundless” has already excluded itself by not venturing 
into being, which seems to be the case in the world he describes. Thus the passage ends on a 
somewhat positive note: authentic triumph is possible. Who must the authentic triumph over? 
The “greater groundlessness,” which includes World Jewry.  
The notion of an enemy that must be found or made in the “struggle” passage “so that 
[the German] Dasein might not lose its edge” is quite foreboding. Heidegger has translated 
polemos as “struggle” [Kampf], and “struggle” as in against “an enemy” or, at least, standing 
firm in opposition to something. This brings up the question: did Heidegger ‘make’ Jewry the 
enemy of the German Dasein? Did he believe Jewry to be the enemy’s true face? In the previous 
sentence he stated that “The enemy does not have to be external, and the external enemy is not 
even always the more dangerous one.” Is Jewry the substitution of the internal enemy Heidegger 
was ‘fundamentally required’ to find or make? Perhaps the enemy should not have been Jewry, 
but “machination” or “Enframement” all along as Heidegger seems to imply later in The 
Question Concerning Technology. Commenting on the political implications of this passage, 
Slavoj Zizek writes in the essay “Struggle, Historicity, Will, and Gelassenheit,”  
Does this not imply that, if there is no enemy out there to be discovered, we are 
justified in “making” (fabricating) it so that our people’s movement will not “lose 
its edge,” that is, so that it will be able to assert its will and program in contrast to 
the enemy? Did Hitler not do exactly this when he “made the enemy” out of 
Jews? Did Stalin not do exactly this in fabricating ever new enemy plots to sustain 
the unity of the Party?”57  
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Heidegger’s last words in the passage, “to cultivate and intensify a constant readiness and to 
prepare the attack looking far ahead with the goal of total annihilation,” are also very ominous. 
While this seems like it could be an answer to the Jewish Question, which he has always kept 
silent about, the context of the quote (Heraclitus on war) constrains that interpretation.  
In the next passage Heidegger describes the relationship between Jewry’s apparent 
increase in power and the development of Western metaphysics. It also introduces important 
terms in Heidegger’s being-historical thinking that must be used as an interpretive context, 
Jewry’s temporary increase in power is, however, grounded in the fact that 
Western metaphysics, especially in its modern development, furnishes the starting 
point for the diffusion of a generally empty rationality and calculative ability, 
which in this way provides a refuge in “spirit” [“Geist”], without being able to 
grasp the hidden decision-regions [Entscheidungsbezirke] on its own. The more 
originary and primordial the prospective decisions and questions, the more they 
remain inaccessible to this “race.”58  
 
This quote first espouses Heidegger’s opinion that World Jewry has undergone an “increase in 
power.” This power is not due to the Jews in themselves, but to a trend in Western metaphysics 
which enables “a generally empty rationality and calculative ability” to become a dominant 
mode of thinking. This way of thinking “provides a refuge in “spirit.” Oddly, Heidegger never 
explicitly gives a definition of “Geist” or “spirit.” In Being and Time, Heidegger says the word 
should be avoided, because of the metaphysical connotations it carries. However, in his 
Rectorship Address, “Geist” is unveiled as an essential aspect of history and a legitimate term.  
The inclusion of quotation marks around “spirit” in the passage indicates that this is not the 
authentic spirit of the Germans, but the pseudo-spirit of Jewry. However, by understanding that 
“empty rationality” “provides a refuge” “without being able to grasp the hidden decision-regions 
on its own,” it can be inferred that despite providing “a refuge in ‘spirit,’” empty rationality 
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cannot “grasp” the “hidden decision-regions” by itself alone. “Hidden decision-regions” 
[Entscheidungsbezirke] is a term that stands out as being inextricably connected with 
Heidegger’s idea of historicality. Generally put, this term indicates the kind of knowledge that is 
necessary to understanding one’s historical Situation, and the kind of knowledge that is revealed 
through authentic historizing as fate, repetition, and the moment of vision as disclosure. 
Historical destiny [Geschick] is defined in a passage from Being and Time as “how we designate 
the historizing of the community, of a people,” while ‘fate’ signifies the authentic historizing of a 
single Dasein. On the same page Heidegger writes, 
Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in 
the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities. Only in 
communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein’s 
fateful destiny in and with its ‘generation’ goes to make up the full authentic 
historizing of Dasein.59  
 
Through repetition and fate, possibilities of existence are disclosed from the past and future. 
These disclosed “possibilities” imply that some knowledge about what to do in the present has 
been revealed. This knowledge may come in the form of decisions and questions: choices one 
must make in order to make the right possibilities come into existence, decisions to make a better 
world, questions that enable more reflections on these choices. Thus, the passage can be read as 
claiming that empty rationality and calculative ability are unable to grasp the knowledge that 
would enable the understanding of the historical destiny of a people by itself. Heidegger 
concludes by writing “The more originary and primordial the prospective decisions and 
questions, the more they remain inaccessible to this ‘race.’”60 Race is placed in quotation marks, 
indicating a part of Heidegger’s broader critique of the concept of biological “race.” This 
passage can be understood as the more important these decisions and questions concerning the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!&*!Heidegger, Being and Time, 436.!!'+!“Heidegger on World Jewry in the Black Notebooks.” !
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history of Being become, the more inaccessible they become to the Jewish people, on account of 
their deriving strength from empty rationality and calculative ability. In summation, this passage 
tells us that World Jewry has become powerful not through its own means, but by excelling at a 
historical trend of thinking that is hegemonic in the modern time period. However, this power is 
lacking in the sense that Jewry is unable to grasp its historical destiny and cannot so long as it 
merely calculates. This leads to the more general idea espoused by Heidegger’s writing that the 
Jewish people are not and cannot be actively engaging in the process of history because they 
cannot grasp these “hidden decision-regions.”  
The previous quote actually continues parenthetically, making a long remark on the 
Jewishness his former colleague, Husserl. In it, Heidegger criticizes Husserl’s reliance upon 
traditional metaphysics and claims this criticism marks an important historical moment in the 
history of Being.  
…The more originary and primordial the prospective decisions and 
questions, the more they remain inaccessible to this “race.” (Thus Husserl’s 
writing on phenomenological observation while dismissing psychological 
explanation and historical settlement of opinions is of lasting significance — and 
yet it goes nowhere near the regions of essential decisions, but rather presupposes 
the historical tradition of philosophy throughout; the necessary consequence is 
reflected immediately in the swing to neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy that 
eventually makes a progression to a Hegelianism in formal sense inevitable. My 
“attack” against Husserl is not directed against him alone and indeed inessentially 
— my attack goes to the neglect of the question of Being, i.e., the essence of 
metaphysics as such, on the ground of which the machination of beings can 
determine history. The attack grounds a historical moment of the highest decision-
making between the primacy of beings and the grounding of the truth of Be-ing.) 
61 
 
The passage says that although Husserl has made remarks of “lasting significance,” he “goes 
nowhere near the regions of essential decisions” (authentic historicality), but merely 
“presupposes the historical tradition of philosophy throughout.” Heidegger states that his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!'"!Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe 96, 46, quoted in “Heidegger on World Jewry in the Black Notebooks.” !
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“attack” is not aimed at Husserl alone, or at least perhaps not his Jewishness, but at the neglect of 
Being. However, the way the parenthetical passage immediately follows the passage about 
‘Jewry’s increase in power,’ beginning with “thus,” we can assume that the Heidegger is 
continuing the logic of the former, saying roughly: ‘Jewry cannot grasp originary decisions 
because it is calculative, thus it makes sense why Husserl, being a Jew, also misses these high 
decision-making regions.’ The final sentence reiterates that his criticism comes at an important 
time in history. Heiddeger’s criticism of Husserl shows how Husserl, as a Jewish philosopher, is 
representative of the greater ills of Jewish thought, his ideas attributed to his Jewishness.  
According to Heidegger, England is also a major player in the historical process. The 
following passage introduces other historical groups who are engaging in a role similar to World 
Jewry; however, it also differentiates them. Furthermore it reveals the ultimate danger that 
Heidegger believes to be at stake: the uprooting of all beings from Being. This danger is found to 
be the destiny of the Jewish people.  
[Why are we recognizing so late that in truth, England is and can be without an 
Occidental stance? Because only in the future will we grasp that England began to 
erect the modern world, but according to its essence, modernity is directed to the 
unfettering of the machination of the entire globe.] The idea of an understanding 
with England in terms of a distribution of imperialist “prerogatives (jurisdictions) 
[Gerechtsamen]” misses the essence of the historical process, which is lead by 
England within the framework of Americanism and Bolshevism and at the same 
time World Jewry to its final conclusion. The question of the role of world Jewry 
is not racial, but the metaphysical question of the type of humanity that can accept 
the world-historical “task” of uprooting all beings from Being.62  
 
Here Heidegger says that understanding England “in terms of a distribution of imperialist 
“prerogatives” misses the essence of the historical process.” The essence of the historical process 
must be understood in terms of the history of Being, not in the traditional historiographical way 
of understanding world events, which only describes things that are present-at-hand. Instead !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!'#!Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe 96, 243, quoted in “7 New Translated Excerpts on Heidegger’s Anti-Semitism.”  
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Heidegger says “the essence of the historical process” “is led by England within the framework 
of Americanism and Bolshevism and the same time world Jewry to its final conclusion.” This 
can be interpreted as saying, England is leading the historical process at the same time as World 
Jewry, however World Jewry will lead it to “its final conclusion.” Next, Heidegger states “The 
question of the role of world Jewry is not racial,” meaning the question is not based on biology, 
there is no biological reason why the Jews have this historical role. The question is the 
“metaphysical question of the type of humanity that can accept the world-historical “task” of 
uprooting all beings from Being.” Heidegger implies that the Jews are precisely the type of 
humanity who can accept the “task” of uprooting all beings from Being. Thus we also find that 
the destiny of World Jewry in the historical process is the “uprooting [of] all beings from Being.”  
Through these passages it has been suggested that although Jewry is somehow 
metaphysically different from other modern groups, the qualities they exhibit and that condemn 
them are not ‘inherently’ Jewish, but modern qualities that Heidegger argued develop from the 
Western tradition of metaphysics. What differentiates Jewry from Americanism, Bolshevism, or 
the English is not decisively evident from these two passages. Perhaps it is that the Jew’s 
“power” is believed to have increased. However, Heidegger would probably agree that the power 
of Americanism and Bolshevism has increased as well. To fully understand the possible 
qualitative or, perhaps in Heidegger’s mind, essential differences between the power and danger 
of World Jewry and other historical entities that would make Jewry the type of humanity who 
can metaphysically take up the “world-historical task” of “uprooting all beings from Being,” one 
would have to look to further sources, which is not possible in the scope of this paper. However, 
it does seem possible at this point to suggest that world Jewry is somehow the expression or even 
the paradigm of this dangerous way of being—empty rationality and calculativeness—that 
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evolved out of Western metaphysics in its modern development. In this way the Jews are not 
exceptionally different from many other historical identities, but the paradigm of modern 
thinking other entities exhibit as well. Thus, Heidegger’s criticism of the Jews becomes in effect 
his criticism of modernity.   
 The next passage is difficult to interpret and sometimes seems self-contradictory, 
however it deals with the important term “machination” or Machenschaft. Machination describes 
what Heidegger will later conceive of as “enframement” [Gestell], which is the subject of 
Heidegger’s critique of modern technology in “The Question Concerning Technology.” 
However, in this passage it is first related to Jewry. 
The Jews, with their marked talent for calculation, “live” longer than anyone by 
the principle of race, which is why they are resisting its consistent application 
with the utmost violence. The establishment [Einrichtung] of racial breeding does 
not stem from “life” itself, but from the overpowering of life through 
machination. What it pushes forward with such a plan is the complete 
deracialization of all peoples by claiming them to a uniformly constructed and 
tailored establishment of all beings. At one with deracialization is the self-
alienation of peoples – the loss of history – i.e., the decision regions of Being.63  
 
The passage begins by criticizing the idea of race. If Jews are part of a race, and this race has 
continued since biblical times, they are the oldest people in the world. I assume that “resisting its 
consistent application” means that they are resisting the application of perhaps the Nuremburg 
Laws which treat every Jewish person as part of a race which is subject to certain laws and 
differentiates them from the “Aryan” race. However, because the Nuremburg Laws were first 
introduced in 1935 and this quote comes from the volume of writing that takes place between 
1939 and 1941, Heidegger could have been referring to other more recent ways in which Jewish 
people were “resisting [race’s] consistent application;” although, my research did not go so far. 
The next sentence is more ambiguous. Its subject could be Jewry or the Nazi party, which !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!'$!Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe 96, 156, quoted in “Heidegger on World Jewry in the Black Notebooks.” GA 96: 156. !
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instituted racial breeding. However, Heidegger’s assessment of it is clear: racial breeding is not 
an evolutionary necessity or normal biological function of life, but arises from machination—the 
ordering of beings so that they produce the most resources. The passage continues that the 
outcome of “such a plan” is the “complete deracialization of all peoples.” It does not seem to be 
racial breeding that leads to deracialization, but machination that “clamp[s] them into a 
uniformly constructed and tailored establishment.” Deracialization is introduced as a principle 
danger to all peoples because it will cause “the self-alienation of peoples” which leads to the 
“loss of history.” From reading about historicality we know that the loss of history is one of the 
worst things that can happen to a people because being historical is what is most essentially 
human. Heidegger seems to imply from this passage that because Jewry’s “talent for calculation” 
and closeness to machination, which will end in the “loss of history,” Jewry should not be 
resisting the “consistent application” of race, which is only being used against them to prevent 
“the self-alienation of all peoples.” In this passage, perhaps what is most important is the way 
Heidegger ties machination with World Jewry. This signifies the beginning of the way Heidegger 
was trying to conceive of machination. As a card holding National Socialist at the time, it is 
somewhat unsurprising that he first began to diagnose this problem in National Socialist terms: 
as an effect of the created enemy.  
 Another passage similar to the previous, also deals with machination. This one too 
suggests dangers that lurk about world Jewry.  
Thus both [the imperialistic-bellicose and humanitarian-pacifistic way of 
thinking] can be used by “international Jewry” to proclaim and accomplish one as 
a means for the other [their common end of a rootless, leveled, homogenous, 
technological mass civilization] – this machinational “history”-making entangles 
all players equally in their webs – 64 
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Here Heidegger describes how both Jewry’s imperialist and pacifist ways of thinking are 
dangerous to the world. However, “this machinational… entangles all players equally in their 
webs” implies something very important to the way he conceives of Jewry. For Heidegger Jewry 
is both active and passive. It actively is trying to influence its position in the world to make a 
better life for itself. However, it is passive, because their actions are destined to lead to a 
“technological mass civilization,” and they too will be “entangle[d]… in their webs” equally. He 
suggests that Jewry’s actions are also detrimental to itself. They are further passive because, as in 
a previous passage, they cannot see what their actions will lead to. Heidegger writes himself as a 
frustrated philosopher who sees the end of the world in a people, the Jews, who cannot see it 
themselves.  
  These passages from the Black Notebooks bring up many more questions than answers. I 
have found that although I have argued that Jewry stands in for what is wrong with modernity, 
and in the end it is modernity that is dangerous to being and not Jewry, the two become so 
conflated throughout his writing that it is difficult to say whether it can really be one or the other. 
Perhaps this conflation is what makes his writings so damning and irrevocably anti-Semitic. 
After reading the passages the question returns: Has Heidegger’s work been contaminated by the 
new revelations of anti-Semitism? Only if it was formerly pure, and what would ‘pure’ writing 
be anyway? We certainly should not take Heidegger’s anti-Semitism as a reason to disregard his 
thought. If anything it makes it all the more important to come to terms with his thought, as anti-
Semitic, but also important to understanding what these prejudices meant. Although, even some 
arguments that Heidegger makes (such as that Jewry is historyless as long as it does not have its 
own “rootedness in the soil,” its own nation) are made by Zionist philosophers as well. What 
seems more important is not that Heidegger used Jewry as an example of the kind of being we 
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should strive away from, but that Heidegger was trying to understand the situation of his own 
time in terms of the force of machination, of which World Jewry is not the only example.   
Heidegger’s thoughts at this period were so imbued with Nazi propaganda that he could 
not separate Jewry from the underlying problems of machination that were actually at stake. 
However, it is not unusual that he interpreted the world with respect to Jewish people 
considering it was such an important topic at the time and it was not only National Socialists 
who were thinking about the “Jewish Question,” as European civilization had been developing 
its identity over hundreds of years by contrasting itself with its Jewish populations.  After the 
war ended, hopefully Heidegger would have realized that he had in fact, despite the promises of 
his historical philosophy, been on the wrong side of history, fought for a side that lost, and 
further, a side that destroyed the sanctity of what is most important about Dasein, that Dasein is a 
human being. However, it has been argued that Heidegger never fully disavowed his National 
Socialist past, and from my research I am led to believe that he probably didn’t. But we must 
remember that it was not the party-line Nazism that Heidegger upheld, but his own ‘spiritual’ 
version of it, which was more concerned with saving Germany from an uprooted technological 
mass civilization than from ‘lesser’ races. What is most important about the passages I have 
analyzed from the Notebooks is that they show the evolution of his criticism of modernity. In 
Being and Time he was most wary of the calculative, everyday, inauthentic ways of being; 
however, in the Notebooks, he has become concerned with machination, mass civilization, and 
the uprooting of being. Later, these ideas would be distilled in the idea of “enframement” 
[Gestell]. 
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Part III: Nietzsche’s Masks and Interpreting the Notebooks 
 
 
A man whose sense of shame has some profundity encounters his destinies and delicate 
decisions, too, on paths which few ever reach and of whose mere existence his closest 
intimates must not know: his mortal danger is concealed from their eyes, and so is his 
regained sureness of life. Such a concealed man who instinctively needs speech for silence 
and for burial in silence and who is inexhaustible in his evasion of communication, wants 
and sees to it that a mask of him roams in his place through the hearts and heads of his 
friends. And supposing he did not want it, he would still realize some day that in spite of 
that a mask of him is there—and that this is well. Every profound spirit needs a mask: even 
more, around every profound spirit a mask is growing continually, owing to the constantly 
false, namely shallow, interpretation of every word, every step, every sign of life he 
gives.—65 
 
The scholarship surrounding Heidegger’s relationship to anti-Semitism asks us to think of 
the task of reading Heidegger as the task of removing masks. It seems to presume that 
somewhere beneath these many layers lies Heidegger’s true face, his naked self. As Nietzsche 
points out, the paradox of this situation is that the profound spirit needs the mask, and 
furthermore, even if he does not want it, already “a mask of him is there.” There have been two 
general ways of responding to Heidegger’s controversial realities, two ways in which some kind 
of separation happens. The first tells the narrative of two Heideggers: the good Heidegger and 
the bad Heidegger. The good Heidegger wrote Being and Time, waxes poetic about language and 
thinking, contributes meaningfully to philosophical discussion and is for the most part 
unproblematic, able to be praised as a hero of the Western canon. The bad Heidegger took a 
political detour, maybe made a personal miscalculation, a mistake, and joined the National 
Socialist party, was an anti-Semite. The first narrative says it is possible to separate these two 
Heideggers, and that one should be saved, while the other avoided, or looked down upon. The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!'&!Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 51.!
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good Heidegger is real, while the bad is not; behind the masks of anti-Semitism, of National 
Socialism, of quite possible madness, lies the true face of a laudable philosophy. This is the way 
that Heidegger has traditionally been understood and is the narrative that Nelly Motroshilova 
falls into.  
In the second narrative the bad Heidegger, the National Socialist, anti-Semitic Heidegger, 
is the real Heidegger. This Heidegger has contaminated the good Heidegger and as such the rest 
of his work stands contaminated, thus rendering it unsavory and unfit to be read, perhaps even 
unfit to be considered ‘Philosophy.’ Behind the masks of a good Heidegger is the face of an 
enemy of philosophy, of respectable humanity. This is the sort of narrative that Victor Farias 
ascribes to, the same that Peter Trawny falls into, although he does not come to the conclusion of 
banning Heidegger. All this discourse attempts to divide Heidegger, to separate him into real and 
fake, to attempt to prove which part of him is real, which part is fake, which part matters and 
which does not. In this way a false choice has arisen. We are asked either to ignore his unsavory 
side or reject him altogether.  
By following either of these narratives we do not disclose Heidegger, but rather conceal 
him further, adding another layer; another “mask [which] is continually growing, owing to the 
constantly false, namely shallow, interpretation of every word, every step, every sign of life he 
gives.—” It is true, Heidegger has many masks, and in this controversy we are constantly trying 
to tear them off, peel them away layer by layer, in hopes of seeing his face, looking upon his true 
nature to decide once and for all whether to keep him or not. But this is not the real issue. If, like 
in these narratives, one interprets Nietzsche’s masks as implying that there is something truer, 
more real, beneath the surface, one would have read Nietzsche incorrectly. Once one digs deeper 
one encounters only more layers, another cave beneath the surface. There is no real Heidegger 
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beneath the many masks. Every mask is Heidegger, has become Heidegger, whether it could 
reflect his intensions or not.  
I was drawn to research this topic partially because the controversy seemed to be coming 
alive again in a new, changed form. Indeed it has. This controversy has largely taken place over 
the internet, opinions being circled in both scholarly and non-scholarly circles. Articles about the 
Black Notebooks took on catchy titles like “The King is Dead – Heidegger’s ‘Black 
Notebooks’,” “Heidegger in Black,” and “What Heidegger was Hiding.” The logic of the 
majority of these articles goes, if Heidegger was an anti-Semite, then we must: stop reading him, 
take away his laurels, and avoid contamination. Babette Babich’s essay “Heidegger’s Black 
Night:  The Nachlass & its Wirkungsgeschichte” has most effectively, so far, commented on the 
immensely complicated nature of this most recently published work and the strangely simplistic 
nature of the debate. Her work evokes the somewhat absurd nature of these debates that are 
reminiscent of a hall filled with the chattering of disembodied voices, an endless production of 
words that all to often seem to take the forest for the trees: 
A year ago disseminated via blogs, today’s Heidegger scandal transpires on 
Facebook, via video, via shared online articles and posts: instant announcement 
with instant commentary on no less than three dedicated Facebook group pages, if 
we do not mention the Heidegger Circle email list. 
What has happened to scholars? What has happened to scholarship? I am 
not here asking Heidegger’s question regarding what he called thinking but a 
perfectly ontic question: what are we doing? We are reading immensely 
complicated, that is to say and on balance, actually fairly diverse texts, reading 
multiple volumes at a time, texts unpublished in the ordinary way of publication, 
all in the absence of any genre or style, all as if the context were immediately 
clear, all as if the tone were in every case unproblematic, accompanied by 
assertoric and perfect authoritative commentary. Is this the new scholasticism?66 
 
The internet has not seemed to help scholarship come to grips with the newly published material. 
Because of its nature or structure in which there can be “instant announcement with instant !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!''!Babette Babich, “Heidegger’s Black Night: The Nachlass & its Wirkungsgeschichte,” forthcoming in Reading 
Heidegger’s Black Notebooks 1931-1941, ed. Ingo Farin and Jeff Malpas (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2016), 12.  !
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commentary” many (obviously, not all are scholars) are writing about the work without having 
read or understood Heidegger’s other works, and people are able to focus on a few incriminating 
passages, taking them as representative of the work as a whole. Furthermore her criticism of the 
way tone has not been taken into consideration is especially important, as, besides her own 
interpretation of a passage from the Notebooks, I have not come across any interpretations of the 
passages that did not read them at face value, as “assertoric and perfectly authoritative 
commentary.” Babich most importantly points out that the nature of this debate is centered on the 
idea of proscription.  
Scholarship is seemingly now to be about proscription, banning Heidegger in 
philosophy as Emmanuel Faye has suggested for as long as the past decade and in 
political theory, as Richard Wolin… as Tom Sheehan in theology/philosophy… 
Most recently, to add to the disciplinary fields of proscription, Christian Fuchs 
demands the elimination of all references to Heidegger from Media Studies and 
theoretical discussions of technology, digital and otherwise. Citing on Faye’s 
contention that Heidegger, “who has espoused the foundations of Nazism cannot 
be considered a philosopher,” Fuch’s solution is non-mention, exclusion from 
theory, non-citation.67  
 
It follows that there is something greater at stake than just the meaning of Heidegger’s anti-
Semitisms, but whether or not Heidegger should be read or studied at all. This conclusion is 
especially troubling, considering that we are still just beginning to understand him, and so much 
of his work remains relevant to our world. I will examine this further after I respond to two 
philosopher’s responses to this controversy.  
 Nelly Motroshilova’s essay “On Heidegger’s Black Notebooks Or, Why Has the 
Publication of Volumes 94-96 of Martin Heidegger’s Collected Works Caused a Sensation?” was 
very helpful to me in providing the context of Heidegger’s self-criticism of Being and Time. It 
also attempts to understand what was so ‘sensational’ about the publication and its controversy. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!'(!Babich, “Heidegger’s Black Night,” 9.!
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While analysis of the Notebooks’ relation to Heidegger’s Contributions and his understanding of 
the decline of the West (Abendlands) is on point, I have to disagree strongly with her conclusion. 
In it she argues that Heidegger’s thought ought to be divided into that which is worthy of his 
already praised name, and that which is not. In this she exemplifies the first narrative of division 
that I discussed earlier.  
Today, as in the past, the question has been raised: How to reconcile the 
philosophical ideas (not by chance ranked as some of the most serious, potent, 
and even classical to come out of the twentieth century) with the anti-Semitism 
that also influenced his concept of nationhood (as well as other –anti’s, e.g., his 
anti-English sentiments). I believe (along with a number of authors who have 
reflected on the issue) that these should not be conflated; instead, they sharply 
contradicted one another. The legacy of Heidegger’s thought is not composed of 
these parts, but fragments into them, one of which (i.e., the philosophical-
theoretical part) is worthy of the outstanding, original thinker (including all the 
changes and turns), while the other, concerned for the most part with social, 
political, and philosophical-historical questions, was as if conceived by another 
person whose arguments often fell into the most abhorrent stereotypes and 
prejudices (originating worst of all from the Nazi period).68  
 
Motroshilova subscribes to the often used notion that one part of Heidegger is “serious, potent, 
and even classical,” while the other is bumbling, prejudicial, a mistake. These two sides “should 
not be conflated” and “they sharply contradicted one another.” The good part should be saved, 
while that bad part should be cordoned off with caution tape. While I do agree with her that the 
anti-Semitisms in the Notebooks often do sound “like the ravings of a madman,”69 his more lucid 
writing does not seem to strongly contradict many of his remarks on world history. However, do 
they really contradict one another, in the sense that his writing on Being and ontology might 
contradict with the logic of his writing on “social, political, and philosophical-historical 
questions”? Are they really “as if conceived by another person”? No. I would strongly suggest 
that they are indeed creations of the same person. They do not contradict, but as I have shown in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!')!Motroshilova, “On Heidegger’s Black Notebooks,” 80-81.!'*!Motroshilova, “On Heidegger’s Black Notebooks,” 80. 
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Parts 1 and 2 of this project, Heidegger’s thinking on Being and his thinking on his historical 
situation are intimately entwined; his understanding of one is predicated on his understanding of 
the other. Motroshilova argues these two sides must not be conflated; I argue, however, that we 
must conflate them. We must integrate our understanding of Heidegger’s faults and virtues if we 
are ever to really come to terms with his philosophy.  
Peter Trawny initiated the scholarly debate on the meaning of the Black Notebooks as he 
is the editor of the volumes and published the first book that deals with their contents, Heidegger 
and the Myth of Jewish World Conspiracy. In this book, and more accessibly, in a discussion last 
year at the Goethe Institute titled “Heidegger’s Black Notebooks: A discussion with Peter 
Trawny and Roger Berkowitz,” he brings up the question of whether Heidegger’s work has been 
contaminated by his anti-Semitic thought. Trawny explains that even before the Black 
Notebooks, Heidegger was known to be anti-Semitic in a private sense, in letters to his wife, etc. 
What has changed now with this publication is that anti-Semitism is implicated in his 
philosophy:  
He was known in a private level as an anti-Semite… [But] it is a difference if the 
philosopher takes these anti-Semitic stereotypes and makes a philosophy out of it 
and this is called being-historical anti-Semitism. At this time anti-Semitism 
becomes a moment of his view of being and this is of course even worse that he 
takes these fatal stereotypes and he transforms them and tries to make a 
philosophy out of them. So that’s the point I guess. What is dangerous for the 
whole philosophy [is] we now have to deal with it in this philosophical context. 
We cannot say anymore, well he has private feelings… that is not the point 
anymore...70 
 
It is in the sense of an anti-Semitic, “spiritual National Socialism,” that Trawny couches the 
question of contamination. This kind of question falls into the second narrative of separation in 
that it suggests that because Heidegger’s anti-Semitism is now “philosophical” instead of merely !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(+!Hannah Arendt Center.  “Heidegger’s Black Notebooks: A discussion with Peter Trawny and Roger Berkowitz.” 
Vimeo video, 1:07:56. May 2, 2014. https://vimeo.com/93670604.!
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“private” it may contaminate the rest of his work, making the ‘bad’ face of Heidegger the real 
one. I would first reply that Heidegger’s work could only be contaminated if it was originally 
pure. I have attempted to show that even Being and Time was not ‘pure’ as it too has unsavory 
implications. But what other praised philosopher’s work is truly pure? The majority of our 
celebrated thinkers throughout history have been sexist, racist, anti-Semitic, and pro-slavery, not 
to mention speciesist. If Heidegger’s work is impure, so is the canon of Western philosophy; and 
with this, today, I think many may agree. The suggestion that if Heidegger’s work is 
contaminated, it should not be regarded so highly, speaks mostly to the white Western 
assumption that its praised ‘fathers’ are without fault, and what is praised is pure. This is not the 
case. What we must learn from this great embarrassment is that philosophy today has to come to 
terms with the legacy of its contribution to oppression. To learn from this we must not ignore 
Heidegger or stop teaching him. Rather, we must do the opposite. We must study and engage 
with him even more critically for what Heidegger is and has been: a great teacher and 
philosopher, a National Socialist, and an anti-Semite. Even Trawny has criticized his concept of 
contamination by wondering if his own thought has been “contaminated” by a “logic of 
purification” which he considers to be problematic. 71 Thus, in this project I aim to turn the 
question regarding the Black Notebooks and their meaning away from the logic of separation, of 
contamination and purity, toward the question of how to integrate the many masks of Heidegger 
in order that we might better understand him.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!("!,In one respect, I should like to criticize myself. The concept of “contamination” corresponds to a logic of 
purification that may have transferred from Heidegger’s idea of a “Purification of Being” into my text. I have let my 
thoughts “contaminate” themselves in some cases. However, poisoned thinking is weak, blind. Have I over 
interpreted Heidegger’s remarks on “World Jewry”? Have I understood the concept of “contamination” literally in 
the sense of becoming-in-contact-with or becoming-comprehended-understood-with. For some reason, Heidegger’s 
thoughts were hung up on the imaginary threat of the “World Jewry.” What, then, would become-in-contact with 
this added threat? It is this logic of cleansing, purification, from which all thinking must unconditionally be 
protected. This means the protection from purification but not the protection from purity.” From Trawny, Heidegger 
und der Mythos, 139.  Translation by Delmer, letter to author, April 15, 2015. 
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An approach to integrating the supposedly disparate sides of Heidegger is through 
Nietzsche’s discussion of the hermit and the metaphor of masks representing the process of 
thinking, writing, and being read.   
The hermit does not believe that any philosopher—assuming that every philosopher was 
first of all a hermit—ever expressed his real and ultimate opinion in books: does one not 
write books precisely to conceal what one harbors? Indeed, he will doubt whether a 
philosopher could possibly have “ultimate and real” opinions, whether behind every one of 
his caves there is not, must not be, another deeper cave—a more comprehensive, stranger, 
richer world beyond the surface, an abysmally deep ground behind every ground, under 
every attempt to furnish “grounds.” Every philosophy is a foreground philosophy—that is a 
hermit’s judgment: “There is something arbitrary in his stopping here to look back and look 
around, in his not digging deeper here but laying his spade aside; there is also something 
suspicious about it.” Every philosophy also conceals a philosophy; every opinion is also a 
hideout, every word also a mask.72 
 
Heidegger concealed much in his books and left us with many silences. Indeed in the later part of 
his life he began to bury himself in silence, to let only his written word speak. Nietzsche’s hermit 
tells us that the philosopher’s “ultimate and real opinions” are not expressed in books and doubts 
whether it is even possible to have them. This asks us to question whether anything Heidegger 
wrote was ultimately ‘what he thought,’ and further if what he is showing even now isn’t another 
mask. Surely this is the case. For example, immediately after Being and Time was published he 
began to revise and correct it. In the Black Notebooks Heidegger had begun to self-criticize the 
work, rewrite it, and change his concepts. Heidegger’s process was of repetition of written 
words, thoughts, and ideas as self-communication, and through this, the evolution of thought.73 
Below the surface of his published works there were deeper caves. Heidegger gave us a view 
into a “deeper cave” in his decision to publish his Schwarze Hefte, a view into “a more 
comprehensive, stranger, richer world beyond the surface.” By allowing us glimpses into these !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(#!Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 229.!($!Ulrich von Bülow (Archivist, German Literary Archive in Marbach, Germany), interview by author, Bard 
College, NY, September 21, 2015.!
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subterranean places, we are being challenged to dig deeper and find that more comprehensive 
meaning. If we take the anti-Semitic passages in the Notebooks at face value, judge them solely 
for being offensive, we have failed to interpret them, failed to pick up the spade at all.  
The question still arises, what can we learn from the anti-Semitic passages that occur in 
the Black Notebooks? Following Motroshilova’s argument that the Notebooks represent a turning 
point in Heidegger’s work from Being and Time, I believe that his comments on World Jewry are 
a small but important part of his attempt to understand and characterize the ‘dangerous’ forces at 
work in the modern world. Heidegger conflates World Jewry and machination: what is clear is 
that he was trying to understand the force of machination, how it comes about, how it presents 
itself. He did this by writing about machination in many examples. What remains unclear is 
exactly what role Jewry serves in aiding the process of machination. Whether he eventually 
stopped associating World Jewry with machination in his private mind we may never know, or 
we may discover when more volumes of the Notebooks are published, as these only cover his 
thoughts from 1931 until 1941. However, in his later writing, especially in The Question 
Concerning Technology, machination is no longer tied to a particular group of people, but to the 
metaphysical force of “enframement” (Gestell). One might then ask, does this mean that because 
of machination’s proximity to World Jewry, and logically following this, enframement, they are 
anti-Semitic ideas themselves? This conclusion can only follow from the logic of contamination. 
Machination and enframement deal with what Heidegger has pinpointed as the essence of 
Western metaphysics. It is the idea of logical ordering, efficiency and management that has 
become ‘a force of nature,’ so to speak, where even human beings become ‘natural resources,’ 
ready for manipulation and optimization. Even Heidegger’s conception in the Black Notebooks 
of Jewry’s tendency for calculativeness, its connection to machination is not a trait that arises 
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from Jewry’s very nature and thus something that philosophically grounds these ideas, but arises 
from their appropriation of the essence of Western metaphysics. In this way World Jewry’s 
nature is not the philosophical grounding of the theory of machination, but functions as an 
expression of the theory’s consequences. In this I am arguing that Jewry’s conflation with 
machination does not make the concept of machination an inherently anti-Semitic one, but it 
does mean that one cannot approach the concept of machination without dealing with 
Heidegger’s example of Jewry. One of the major issues at stake in the Black Notebooks is not 
‘how world Jewry ruined the world,’ but how people are increasingly estranged from their past 
rooted-in-the-earth traditions, and how their lives are increasingly ordered and mechanized on a 
mass scale. Thus I read his comments on World Jewry not merely as examples of prejudice, but 
as one of many lenses through which Heidegger viewed a problem, one answer to the question of 
how machination manifests itself in the world. In this way World Jewry is another mask of 
machination. 
Although Heidegger was mainly concerned with the West, the effects of Gestell, of 
enframement and machination, are felt throughout the globe. To ignore the evolution of this 
thinking in the Black Notebooks, or to condemn it as a contamination unfit to be interpreted, 
would not give Heidegger the hermeneutic justice he deserves. Furthermore, to condemn the rest 
of his work by its association with anti-Semitism and National Socialism seems to me to be mere 
intellectual cowardice, and in the examples of people who have attempted to dissociate 
themselves from Heidegger’s work since the Notebooks’ publication there is more of an attempt 
to save one’s own reputation than an act of moral righteousness.  
The traditional ways of reading Heidegger such as an ahistorical reading, attempts to 
unmask the real Heidegger and thus to label another part fake, to count one mask as more 
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important than another, one more worthy of the title of philosophy than another, to condemn an 
entire body of work based on the contamination of one idea, are all problematic. In each one of 
these something important is elided, some meaning is lost. Instead we must attempt to read 
Heidegger ‘holistically.’ This means that we take every one of his writings as a legitimate part of 
his philosophical oeuvre, as parts of a interconnecting whole, even if parts of it are problematic. 
In this we protect Heidegger’s writing from “logic of cleansing [and] purification, from which all 
thinking must unconditionally be protected.” However, by making even the problematic parts of 
Heidegger’s work important, we do not want to forget their issues. This is why I want to stress 
that we must read his writing and interpret him critically.  
Heidegger’s writing is implicated in a legacy of oppression, but this is a legacy that the 
majority of the history of philosophy is a part of as well. Refusing to read or to teach one man’s 
thought that is a part of this legacy does not save us from the legacy of oppression ourselves 
because we have already partaken in it. But, the risk of separating the oppressions in philosophy, 
of eliding them through censorship, is not only a risk to philosophy itself, but a risk to the way 
we position ourselves to resist oppression. If we exculpate philosophy we risk stripping it of its 
potential to resist and understand oppressions. From the anti-Semitisms in the Black Notebooks 
we learn not only about machination and history, but also about the history and philosophy of 
anti-Semitism and the history of thought during World War II. The right thing to do is not to 
ignore, to be blind to thought, but to come to terms with it. As my project itself attests, we must 
continue reading Heidegger, both the ‘good’ parts and the ‘bad.’ This is the only way that we 
may begin to read Heidegger “authentically.” 
 
 
! &(!
Bibliography 
 
Babich, Babette. “Heidegger’s Black Night: The Nachlass & its Wirkungsgeschichte.”  
Forthcoming in Reading Heidegger’s Black Notebooks 1931-1941, Edited by Ingo Farin  
and Jeff Malpas. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2016.   
 
Bülow, Ulrich von. Interview by author, Bard College, NY, September 21, 2015.  
 
Delmer, Thomas. Letter to author. April 15, 2015.  
 
Fried, Gregory, and Richard Polt. Nature, History, State 1933-1934. New York: Bloomsbury  
Academic, 2015.  
 
Fritsche, Johannes. Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger's 'Being and Time.'  
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. 
 
Hannah Arendt Center.  “Heidegger’s Black Notebooks: A discussion with Peter Trawny and  
Roger Berkowitz.” Vimeo video, 1:07:56. May 2, 2014. https://vimeo.com/93670604.!
 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Hegel’s Idea of Philosophy: With a New Translation of  
Hegel’s Introduction to the History of Philosophy. Translated by Quentin Lauer. New  
York: Fordham University Press, 1983.  
 
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson.  
New York: Harper & Row, 1965. 
 
—. Being and Truth. Translated by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. Indiana: Indiana University  
Press, 2010.  
 
—. Gesamtausgabe IV. Abteilung: Hinweise und Aufzeichnungen Band 95 Überlegungen VII-XI  
(Schwarze Hefte 1938-1939). Edited by Peter Trawny. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann,  
2015.  
 
—. Gesamtausgabe IV. Abteilung: Hinweise und Aufzeichnungen Band 96, Überlegungen XII- 
XV (Schwarze Hefte 1939-1941). Edited by Peter Trawny. Frankfurt: Vittorio  
Klostermann, 2014.  
 
—. The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. Translated by William Lovitt. New  
York: Harper & Row, 1977.  
 
Johnson, Greg. “Heidegger on World Jewry in the Black Notebooks.” Counter Currents  
Publishing. March 29, 2014. http://www.counter-currents.com/2014/03/heidegger-on- 
world-jewry-in-the-black-notebooks/. 
 
Motroshilova, Nelly. “On Heidegger’s Black Notebooks: Or, Why Has the Publication of  
! &)!
Volumes 94-96 of Martin Heidegger’s Collected Works Caused a Sensation?” Russian  
Studies in Philosophy 52, no. 4 (2015): 70-86. doi: 10.1080/10611967.2014.1030326.  
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: 
Vintage Books, 1989. 
 
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Anti-Semite and Jew: An Exploration of the Etiology of Hate. Translation by  
George Becker. New York: Schocken Books, 1976. 
 
Schrag, Calvin. “Heidegger on Repetition and Historical Understanding,” Philosophy East and  
West 20, no. 3 (1970): 287-295. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398310. 
 
Siegel, Zachary. “7 New Translated Excerpts on Heidegger’s Anti-Semitism.” Critical Theory.  
February 23, 2015. http://www.critical-theory.com/7-new-translated-excerpts-on- 
heideggers-anti-semitism/.  
 
Wolin, Richard. The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader. MIT Press Edition, 1993.!
 
 
 
